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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
have been precluded in this case even if properly adopted
under the 1892 act 5 1
In the principal case, the Maryland court states it is
not asked to decree appellant the adopted child of decedent,
but only to place her in the same testamentary position. It
then says that since it cannot declare her to be the child
(by adoption) of testatrix, it cannot place her in the desired
testamentary position. The only conclusion remaining is
that Maryland will not permit specific performance of a
contract to adopt nor any of its equitable attributes, at
least where there is not an actual intestacy. It has been
said5 2 "it is significant that the liberal position (re inheri-
tance by adopted child) is expressed chiefly by courts west
of the Mississippi River. Perhaps the peculiar geographical
division can be explained, in part, by the fact that the
principle of consanguinity did not take a firm hold in the
Western states, where pride was taken in an asserted free-
dom from "hide-bound tradition". In 1947 the rights of
adopted children were further liberalized by the Maryland
Legislature with respect to inheritance from collaterals 5
If the instant question should arise again, might not the
Maryland Court construe this enactment as an expression
of legislative policy tending toward a more liberal inter-
pretation of the adoptive status in general?
IMMUNITY FROM PROCESS OF ONE INDUCED
BY FRAUD TO COME TO STATE
Margos v. Moroudas'
This case was a consolidation of two suits, one brought
by Mary Margos for personal injuries sustained by her
while riding in an automobile operated by the defendant,
Gus Moroudas, and the second brought by Mike Margos,
" But see Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 93, Sec. 139A, quoted infra, n. 53.
2Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession By and From the Adopted Child (1943),
28 Wash. U. Law Quart. 221, 236.
"Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 93, Sec. 139A: "In the application of the
provisions of this sub-title there shall be no distinction between a legally
adopted child and a child by birth, to the end that such adopted child
shall take from, through and as a representative of its adopting parent or
parents, and the lineal or collateral kindred of such adopting parent or
parents in the same manner as a child by birth and to the end that upon
the death of an adopted child intestate without surviving descendants,
such child's property, exclusive of the share of such child's surviving
spouse, shall pass and be distributed in the same manner as if such child
had been born to such adopting parent or parents in lawful wedlock."
'184 Md. 362, 40 A. 2d 816 (1945).
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her husband, for loss of services and medical expenses
resulting from that injury. The defendant was a resident
of West Virginia; the plaintiffs were residents of Penn-
sylvania; and the accident occurred in the latter state. At
the time these suits were brought the statute of limitations
had run against the plaintiff in both West Virginia and
Pennsylvania, so the suits were entered in The Baltimore
City Court in the State of Maryland. Although actual ser-
vice of process was had upon the defendant in the City of
Baltimore, he appeared specially and filed a motion to
quash the writ of summons and to set aside the return of
the sheriff thereon, upon the contention that the circum-
stances surrounding the service of process rendered it
invalid.
The undisputed testimony indicated that Gus Moroudas
was on good terms with Mike and Mary Margos after the
accident and that he had no reason to suspect that they
planned to bring suit against him. In reliance upon the
representations of Mike Margos that he might be of aid to
them in collecting insurance, the defendant traveled from
Pennsylvania to Baltimore where he contacted a Baltimore
attorney who he believed to be the insurance agent. The
plaintiff's attorney, however, had prearranged with this
party for the service of process on the defendant, and it
was forthwith carried out. The testimony of the defendant
indicated that he had no other business in Baltimore and
that he came to that city only at the request of the plaintiff
and upon the receipt of forty dollars from the plaintiff to
cover expenses of the trip. He knew nothing of the pending
suit and had no suspicion that a suit was contemplated.
From the evidence before the court it was concluded
that the presence of the defendant in Baltimore and the
service of process upon him was procured by fraud, trick-
ery, and artifice, and there was presented for the first time
in this state the question of whether or not service procured
under such circumstances will be set aside when a motion
to quash the writ of summons is made. Although the
precise question had not been dealt with in Maryland
heretofore, authorities elsewhere 2 are strong in their sup-
port of the defendant's case, and the lower court's decision
'Cited in the decision were: Ex parte Johnson, 167 U. S. 120 (1897);
Dunlap v. Cody, 31 Iowa 260 (1871) ; Townsend v. Smith, 47 Wis. 623, 3
N. W. 439 (1879) ; Wood v. Wood, 78 Ky. 624 (1880); Cavanaugh v. Man-
hattan Transit Company, 133 F. 818 (C. C. D. N. J. 1905) ; Empire Mfg. Co.
v. Ginsburg. 253 Ill. App. 242 (1929) ; Steiger v. Bonn, 4 F. 17 (C. C. D. N. J.
1880) ; Williams v. Reed, 29 N. J. 385 (1862) ; Sessoms Grocery Company
v. International Sugar Feed Company, 188 Ala. 232, 66 So. 479 (1914).
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that the writ of summons be quashed was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Since this was a transitory action and there was an ac-
tual service of process upon the defendant in the City of
Baltimore prior to the trial, there was no contention that
the court was without jurisdiction over the subject matter
or over the person, it being well settled that a transitory
action may be brought against a non-resident for a tort
committed beyond the territorial limits of the state3 if the
defendant is found within the state and personal service
is had against him.4 Thus it is clear, and the court so indi-
cated in its decision, that the fraud and trickery involved
in the service of process in no way deprived the court of
the jurisdiction over the person so gained and that the
granting of the defendant's motion was not based upon
any theory of jurisdictional lack. This view is substanti-
ated by the generally accepted rule that a judgment pro-
cured in a suit in which jurisdiction over the person is
procured under circumstances similar to those in this case
is not void and is not open to collateral attack on the point
of personal jurisdiction in the same state or in other states.'
Prior to this case it was well settled in Maryland that
a non-resident who comes into the state solely for the pur-
pose of appearing as a witness or as a party plaintiff or
defendant in a civil or criminal proceeding is, while here
for that purpose and while entering or leaving in good faith
and without unreasonable delay, exempt from the service
of process for a suit instituted against him in this state.,
The problem of the present case, however, is not entirely
analogous to those involving parties to a judicial proceeding
since the exemptions in those cases are granted as a matter
IN. C. Railway Co. v. Scholl, 16 Md. 317, 77 Am. Dec. 295 (1860) ; State,
Use of Allen v. P. & C. R. R. Co., 45 Md. 41 (1876).
Hieston v. Natl. City Bk. of Chicago, 132 Md. 389, 104 A. 281 (1918).
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, See. 15. It is to be noted that this statement
deals only with a collateral attack upon such a judgment based upon the
allegation that the court was without jurisdiction, and does not raise the
problem of whether or not the full faith and -redit clause precludes the
showing of fraud to defeat such a judgment in a suit upon it in another
state. On this point see: Levin v. Gladstein, 142 N. C. 482, 55 S. E. 37
(1906) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d Ed.) Sec. 206.
6Feuster v. Redshaw, 157 Md. 302, 145 A. 560 (1929). An exception to
this rule is noted in Mullen v. Sanborn & Mann, 79 Md. 364, 29 A. 522, 47
Am. St. Rep. 421, 25 L. R. A. 721 (1894), which held that, "the exemption
was denied in favor of a non-resident party who, after having caused an
attachment to be issued on original process against a citizen of this state
-that is quashed, is, while voluntarily appearing to testify in his own
behalf at the trial of the short note case, summoned in an action against
him at that time begun in this state by the debtor for damages for wrong
fully and maliciously causing the attachment to be issued."
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of public policy in the due administration of justice, the
theory being that such a rule tends to assure the attendance
of such non-resident parties by virtue of the guarantee
that they will not be distracted, harassed, or intimidated
by the prospects of service of process for the commence-
ment of other litigation against them within this state.'
Such considerations do not present themselves in the pres-
ent case, and the court did not purport to have reached its
decision by a mere extension of these exemptions to include
persons whose presence in the state was procured by fraud.
It is apparent, then, that the court did not rely on either
lack of jurisdiction over the person or exemption from ser-
vice as the possible basis for its action granting the de-
fendant's motion to quash the writ of summons but rested
its decision on the equitable principle that the law will not
permit a party to take advantage of his own wrongs. The
court quoted the rule as stated in American Jurisprudence: 8
".... Relief is accorded in such cases not because,
by reason of fraud, the court did not get jurisdiction
of the person of the defendant by the service, but on the
ground that the court will not exercise its jurisdiction
in favor of one who has obtained service of his sum-
mons by unlawful means. Thus, if a person resident
outside the jurisdiction of the court and the reach of
its process is inveigled, enticed, or induced, by any
false representation, deceitful contrivance, or wrongful
device for which the plaintiff is responsible, to come
within the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of
obtaining service of process on him in an action brought
against him in such court, process served upon him
through such improper means is invalid, and upon
proof of such fact the court will, on motion, set it
aside .... "
A clear distinction was drawn between the instant case
and that of Jaster v. Currie' on which the plaintiffs strongly
relied. In that case suit had been filed against the defendant
in the state of his residence, and he was later served notice
by the plaintiff's attorney that the plaintiff's deposition
would be taken in another state on a certain day. On advice
of counsel the defendant went to that state and was pres-
ent at the taking of the deposition, but before he could
leave the state process was served upon him on a suit on
' Supra, n. 6.
8 42 Am. Jur., Process, Sec. 35.
9 198 U. S. 144 (1905).
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the same cause of action instituted against him in that state.
The defendant alleged that the deposition was merely a
ruse for the purpose of enticing him into the state in order
to secure service of process, the Supreme Court, however
upheld the writ of summons. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland agreed with that decision on the facts presented
but distinguished the present case on several material dif-
ferences. Here the parties were not at arms length, nor
was it contemplated by the defendant that they would be-
come so, and the defendant was directly misled by the
representations of the plaintiff and was thus decoyed with-
in the jurisdiction of the Maryland court. In the Jaster
v. Currie1° case, however, the plaintiff and the defendant
were already party litigants, and although the defendant
came into the state as the result of the plaintiff's notice
of the deposition, the deposition could have been arbitrarily
taken and there was no misrepresentation with regard to
the motives of the plaintiff or any other circumstance lead-
ing to the service of process on the defendant.
From a consideration of the facts of the instant case
and the cases cited by the court as authority for its deci-
sion, it becomes apparent that in all of them there exists the
common denominator of a false and fraudulent representa-
tion on the part of the plaintiff by which the defendant is
induced to enter the state, when the true purpose of the
device was to procure service of process upon him. Where
such a situation occurs the Court of Appeals in the Margos
v. Moroudas case" has clearly established the rule that the
wrongdoer shall not be allowed to profit by his wrongs,
and upon proper motion, the writ of summons will be
quashed.
"CLEAN HANDS" NOT REQUIRED FOR
BIGAMY ANNULMENT
Townsend v. Morgan, alias Townsend, et al.'
In this case the plaintiff-appellant-husband brought
a suit for annulment of marriage, alleging bigamy, against
defendant - appellee - wife. There was joined as a co-
defendant a building association, for the purpose of the
further relief of clarifying title to certain real estate in-
10 Ibi .
11 Supra, n. 1.
163 A. 2d 743 (Md. 1949).
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